In 1993, the Singapore Parliament enacted legislative provisions adapted from Australian legislation directing, inter alia, that the courts apply the purposive approach in statutory interpretation. Those provisions also allowed for the extended use of extrinsic materials in the interpretative process. Fifteen years on, there is now a considerable body of Singapore case law to which a meaningful analysis may be undertaken. Indeed, from an initially cautious application of the enacted legislation, the courts began to read the enactments expansively, eventually providing for a statutory interpretation regime that is largely free of the confi nes of old. Nonetheless, the Singapore position does lend itself to some unique problems, as there are signs that the courts have in a limited number of cases evinced an intention to reverse the hitherto rather expansive approach. This article provides a brief overview of the evolution of the Singapore position to its present form, before making a brief comparison with parallel developments in Australia, from which Singapore's provisions originated. It will then attempt to explain the present Singapore position in relation to statutory interpretation as distinguished from that taken in Australia. It is hoped that the account provided in this article will be of comparative interest to jurisdictions which have adopted similar legislative reform and, more broadly, to the enduring problem of the proper approach towards statutory interpretation.
Introduction
Legislation prescribing principles of statutory interpretation are not new or uncommon. Indeed, several jurisdictions in the Commonwealth today have legislation providing for, among others, a particular approach to be taken in interpreting statutes. For example, Australia has sections 15AA and 15AB of the (Australian) Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which, respectively, cover the approach to be taken in the interpretation of Commonwealth Acts (and delegated legislation made under such Acts) and the circumstances in which the use of extrinsic materials may be permitted in undertaking such interpretation. 1 Provisions based on sections 15AA and 15AB have also been enacted in state and territorial provisions in Australia subsequently. 2 The situation is similar in New Zealand, which has section 5(1) of the (New Zealand) Interpretation Act 1999, providing for a purposive approach to be adopted. 3 However, there is no provision in New Zealand legislation providing for the circumstances in which extrinsic materials may be referred to; that is a matter left to the courts to resolve. 4 As a fi nal example, there is a provision in every Canadian Interpretation Act directing interpreters to give to every enactment ' such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as 1 Sections 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 are discussed in greater detail below.
For present purposes, it ought to be pointed out that section 15AA applies to Commonwealth Acts as well as delegated legislation made under such Acts by virtue of section 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003. Section 15AB applies to Commonwealth Acts as well as delegated legislation made under such Acts under section 46 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. A further discussion of these sections can be found below. 29 -38 and 78 -113. 3 This particular section directs that the meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose and has as its predecessor section 5(7) of the (New Zealand) Interpretation Act 1888. Section 5(7), in turn, subject to few substantive amendments, became section 5(j) of the (New Zealand) Acts Interpretation Act 1924. Section 5(j) provided as follows: ' Every Act, and ever provision or enactment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything Parliament deems to be for the public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of anything it deems contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and of such provision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit ' . Section 5(j) remained the law in New Zealand until the present section 5(1) was enacted: see New Zealand Law Commission, A New Interpretation Act to Avoid ' Prolixity and Tautology ' (Report No. 17 
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that is both expansive and distinctly independent of the English position. In fact, it had enacted legislative provisions largely similar to the Australian provisions in 1993 by amending the then-existing Interpretation Act 10 to put in place legislative reform on statutory interpretation. The adaptation of the Australian provisions was done swiftly and without much analysis of other parallel legislative provisions in, for example, New Zealand and Canada. Yet, it is undeniable, given the similarity in the legislative wording, that there is a historical nexus between the Singapore and Australian provisions. Today, 15 years later, there now exists a considerable body of Singapore case law of which a meaningful analysis of its statutory interpretation approach may be undertaken. The situation in Singapore is interesting not only for its own sake but also as a point of comparison with other jurisdictions, especially the Australian approach, from which Singapore based its 1993 legislative reform on. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to fi rst provide a brief update of the present Singapore approach to statutory interpretation. It will then compare this with the Australian approach 11 to see if, as in the Canada -New Zealand example, there is now departure in approach notwithstanding the similarity in legislative wording and origin. The article will then conclude by attempting to explain any differences between the current approaches in Singapore and Australia by highlighting the differences which exist between the two jurisdictions.
Background to the Present Singapore Statutory Interpretation Approach
Before outlining the present Singapore statutory interpretation approach, it may be useful to briefl y recount the background leading to the 1993 legislative reform. Fifteen years ago, the Singapore Parliament in 1993 swiftly passed the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993, enacting into law statutory provisions 12 within the then-existing Interpretation Act, heralding in by way of legislative reform a new era of statutory interpretation in Singapore. The background to the aforementioned legislative reform was that the Interpretation (Amendment) Bill was fi rst introduced in Parliament on 18 January 1993, where it was ordered to be read a 10 (Cap. 1, 1985 rev. edn.) . Since 1993, the Interpretation Act has been amended several times, but mainly indirectly due to amendments to other Acts. The only time when it was amended directly and substantively was in 1998 via the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1998 (No. 22 of 1998 , which inserted section 2A, which in turn concerned the criteria for determining death, into the Act. Owing to the social importance of this amendment, there was a select committee report on the Interpretation (Amendment) Bill (No. 17 of 1997) (see Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Offi cial Report , vol. 69, No. 9 , at cols. 502 -9) although there was no similar report for the insertion of sections 9A(1) -(4) in 1993. The present edition of the Act is the 2002 revised edition but the chapter number remains unchanged. 11 While the Australian approach to statutory interpretation would rightly include a discussion of all state and territorial approaches as well, the primary focus of this article will be on the effect of the Commonwealth statute, viz., sections 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. 12 The provisions concerned were sections 9A(1) -(4) of the Interpretation Act (Cap. 1, 1985 rev. edn) .
The present edition of the Interpretation Act is the 2002 revised edition. The amending Act to the 1985 edition of the Interpretation Act was the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993 (No. 11 of 1993 .
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A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 199 second time at the next available parliamentary sitting. 13 The Bill was then read a second and third time on 26 February 1993 and passed into law, coming into effect on 16 April 1993. Altogether, the entire legislative process took less than three months. The pertinent sections enacted (or, more accurately, amended into the existing Interpretation Act) were as follows:
Purposive interpretation of written law and use of extrinsic materials 9A -(1) In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object. (2) Subject to subsection (4), in the interpretation of a provision of a written law, if any material not forming part of the written law is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material -(a) to confi rm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law; or (b) to ascertain the meaning of the provision when -(i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or (ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
(3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (2), the material that may be considered in accordance with that subsection in the interpretation of a provision of a written law shall include -(a) all matters not forming part of the written law that are set out in the document containing the text of the written law as printed by the Government Printer; (b) any explanatory statement relating to the Bill containing the provision; (c) the speech made in Parliament by a Minister on the occasion of the moving by that Minister of a motion that the Bill containing the provision be read a second time in Parliament; (d) any relevant material in any offi cial record of debates in Parliament; S tatute L aw R eview 200 (e) any treaty or other international agreement that is referred to in the written law; and (f) any document that is declared by the written law to be a relevant document for the purposes of this section.
(4) In determining whether consideration should be given to any material in accordance with subsection (2), or in determining the weight to be given to any such material, regard shall be had, in addition to any other relevant matters, to -(a) the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the written law; and (b) the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage.
The rather short legislative proceedings provided few clues as to the object and purpose behind the enactment of these sections. All that can be deciphered with any confi dence is that the legislative reform addressed three broad issues, namely, fi rst, the approach to be taken by the courts in interpreting statutes; secondly, the circumstances in which extrinsic materials may be referred to in interpreting statutes; and thirdly, the type of extrinsic materials which may be referred to. If at all, the minister's speech at the Second Reading of the Interpretation (Amendment) Bill 1993 highlighted the purposive approach as being the ' main amendment ' 14 so as to result in the promotion of the ' underlying purpose behind the legislation ' . 15 To a member's suggestion that the ' mythical ' 16 legislative intent was really attributable to the draftsman who drafted the words, the minister disagreed, stating that ' in this Government, in this Cabinet, the decisions and the intentions are made by Cabinet and the Ministers which compose the Cabinet ' . 17 As for the circumstances in which the courts may make use of extrinsic materials, the minister referred to the House of Lords decision of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart 18 but perhaps inadvertently left out the effect of section 9A(2) in his speech. He said that the amendments were to ' enable the Courts to have recourse to the use of Ministerial statements made in Parliament when interpreting any statute in order to ascertain the intention of Parliament should the statute be ambiguous or obscure in its purpose or if a literal reading of the statute would lead to an absurdity ' . 19 Whether fully intended or not, this ignored the use of extrinsic materials when the statutory provision A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 201 concerned was neither ambiguous nor would lead to an absurdity, whereas the new section 9A(2)(a) quite clearly conferred a confi rmatory use of extrinsic materials even when there was no ambiguity or absurdity. Above all, however, the minister made it quite clear that in an age when the courts are fl ooded with ' ever increasing legislation of a complexity and variety not encountered before ' , 20 the courts must have recourse to such extrinsic materials to ' make well reasoned decisions ' and that such materials ' may well be crucial to [the courts ' ] deliberations ' . 21 Nonetheless, the timing and the context in which the legislative reform took place were perhaps satisfactorily indicative of the underlying reasons. First, the legislative reform took place shortly after the seminal House of Lords decision of Pepper v. Hart , which permitted recourse to extrinsic materials in statutory interpretation under limited circumstances. 22 at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
S tatute L aw R eview 202 decision must be considered in the context of other decisions following other interpretative approaches. 28 The same uncertainty existed for the use of extrinsic materials in aid of interpretation. The Singapore Parliament evidently wanted to provide an authoritative direction in the face of confl icting approaches. Thirdly, caught in a time of similar developments elsewhere, especially similar legislation adopted in Australia and New Zealand, the Singapore Parliament might have wanted to adopt an approach which it perceived as being widely accepted around the Commonwealth. In the fi nal analysis, however, the speed by which the Singapore Parliament was able to pass these enactments into law made it diffi cult to appreciate the detailed reasons behind the 1993 legislative reform. 29 Nonetheless, in the years which followed, the Singapore courts took it upon themselves to expound upon the proper application of these new provisions in the Interpretation Act. What emerged was a considerable body of case law outlining a distinctively unique Singapore position. Three broad issues arise for consideration, and the next part of this article discusses each in turn.
The Present Singapore Statutory Interpretation Approach (A) Purposive Approach
The fi rst issue is the effect of section 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act in Singapore. This section directs that the courts adopt a purposive approach in statutory interpretation. After the 1993 legislative reform, the Singapore courts have stated the purposive approach to be the dominant interpretative approach to be used. In one of the most comprehensive survey of the law relating to section 9A of the Interpretation Act, V. K. Rajah JA in the Singapore High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng 30 stated that in Singapore, any discussion on the construction of statutes takes place against the backdrop of that particular section. 31 The learned judge opined that section 9A(1) ' mandated ' a construction promoting legislative purpose to be preferred over one that does not promote such purpose or object. 32 Accordingly, in Rajah JA's view, any common law interpretative approach, such as the plain meaning rule and the strict construction rule, must yield to the purposive 28 For example, in Wah Tat Bank Ltd v. Chan Cheng Kum [1972 -1974 SLR 335 the Singapore High Court adopted the ' plain and ordinary meaning ' of a certain statutory provision without (expressly) considering either the purpose or intention behind the statute. Similarly, in The ' Permina 108 ' [1975 ' Permina 108 ' [ -1977 SLR 221 the Singapore Court of Appeal gave the statutory provision concerned its ' plain and ordinary meaning ' because the words were ' free of any ambiguity ' and ' not reasonably capable of more than one meaning ' . The Court of Appeal subsequently declined to consider extrinsic materials in the form of an international treaty to interpret the statutory provision concerned. 29 Singapore . 35 It is fair to say that the purposive approach has taken root in Singapore following the enactment of section 9A(1). Indeed, a great many terminologies have been used to express this purposive approach, for example: to ' ascertain the true legislative intention ' , 36 ' to put Parliament's intention into effect ' 37 , ' to [give] effect to the intention of the legislature ' , 38 ' to give effect to the intent and will of Parliament ' , 39 or simply that the court ' should prefer an interpretation that will promote the purpose or object underlying the [Act concerned] (thereby replicating the words of section 9A(1)) ' . 40 The general approach seems to be broadly that it is the legislative intent that must be given effect to.
Yet, despite this largely consistent front, there exists beneath the surface difficulties which require more specifi c consideration. First, there may be some conceptual misunderstanding of the true meaning of the purposive approach. In 33 Ibid. See also [44] , wherein the learned judge referred to section 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act and held that the reference there to the reference to extrinsic materials when confi rming or ascertaining that the meaning of the statutory provision is the ' ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law an the purpose or object underlying the written law ' is an unequivocal rejection of the literal rule and/or any other approach suggesting that the purpose or object can be considered only when the ordinary meaning is obscure or ambiguous. However, the position was never as clear at the start. Indeed, it was at fi rst thought that ambiguity or absurdity was required before the purposive approach could be resorted to. Although the judge said that he was ' mindful ' of section 9A, he thought that that section did not affect the common law position and therefore the courtsS tatute L aw R eview 204 some cases, the courts have stated that the purposive approach allows for the recourse to extrinsic materials. For instance, in Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng itself, Rajah JA stated that the purposive approach ' allows the judge the latitude to look beyond the four corners of the statute, should he fi nd it necessary to ascribe a wider or narrower interpretation to its words ' . 41 As would be appreciated, strictly speaking, that is not entirely accurate since there are really two issues involved here: the purposive approach concerns the ' method ' statutory provisions are to be interpreted, whereas the recourse to extrinsic materials concerns the ' materials ' which may be referred to in carrying out the purposive interpretative approach. 42 Secondly, it appears relatively unsettled what the purposive approach allows the courts to do. Specifi cally, the line between ' interpreting ' a statutory provision and ' rewriting ' the provision (i.e. by adding or subtracting to the legislative words) appears to be unclear. While Rajah JA was adamant in Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng that the purposive approach does not allow for the interpretation of statutory provisions so as to go against all possible and reasonable interpretation of the express literal wording of the provision, 43 the position is not clear. Indeed, this robust declaration must be contrasted with other decisions, particularly the one from the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Tribunal 44 in Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995 , 45 which seemingly accepted the argument that the courts are allowed to ' to modify or reject the literal meaning of any provision to give effect to [the statutory] purpose or object, and to change the legislative words to achieve that purpose or object, once the intention of Parliament was ascertained ' . 46 More relevantly, the Singapore High Court has in at least one decision, under the articulated reason of advancing the legislative intent, actually introduced concepts into a statute not expressly provided for. 47 Thirdly, it is not certain whether the purposive approach gives way to ' other ' common law principles of statutory interpretation in cases concerning penal statutes. In Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng , Rajah JA endorsed a line of Singapore cases which provide for the adoption of the ' strict construction approach ' in relation to penal statutes when the literal and purposive interpretations of the provision concerned nonetheless leave the meaning in ambiguity. 48 This presupposes that there might be cases in which the legislative intent is absent or indiscernible and would also go against Rajah JA's own view in Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng that ' [a]ll written law ( penal or otherwise ) must be interpreted purposively ' . 49 Fourthly, though this does not really count as a ' problem ' , the courts are not clear whether it is the general purpose of the statute or the specifi c purpose behind a specifi c statutory provision that they should be concerned with. The greater trend, 50 on balance, appears to be for the cases to focus on the purpose behind a ' particular ' statutory provision. For example, in Public Prosecutor v. Keh See Hua , 51 Yong Pung How CJ was able to locate an extract of the minister's Second Reading speech to construe the purpose of section 5(8) of the Employment of Foreign Workers ' Act. 52 In the fi nal analysis, the broad effect of section 9A(1) resulting in the widespread adoption of the purposive approach must therefore be viewed with an eye on the diffi culties just discussed.
(B) Circumstances In Which Reference to Extrinsic Materials Permitted
Moving on to the second issue of concern, this relates to the circumstances in which reference to extrinsic materials is permitted following the enactment of section 9A of the Interpretation Act. The position in Singapore has, once again, been authoritatively restated by Rajah JA in Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng . In that case, the learned judge emphasized that extrinsic materials may be referred to by the courts in statutory interpretation even where the meaning of the provision concerned is clear in its face. 53 This proposition is, of course, well supported by section 9A(2), which allows for both the confi rmation of a meaning reached (under which no ambiguity or absurdity is required) and the ascertainment of meaning (under which no ambiguity or absurdity is required). Such clarity was, however, not as evident just less than a decade ago. In the fi rst case to interpret section 9A, 48 See Teng Lang Khin v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 50 For an example where the court looks at the general purpose behind the statute, see Raffl es City Pte Ltd v. Attorney General [1993] 3 SLR 580. 51 [1994] 2 SLR 277. 52 (Cap. 91A, 1991 rev. edn.) . 53 [1993] 3 SLR 580 at [45] .
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Raffl es City Pte Ltd v. Attorney General , 54 L. P. Thean J seemed to refer only to the ascertainment aspect of section 9A(2) and opined that section 9A(2) ' allows the courts, in appropriate cases, to have recourse to additional materials … to ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision ' . 55 There was no mention of the confi rmatory aspect of section 9A(2) even though Thean J made no express fi nding of ambiguity or obscurity. The early trend in the decisions was thus to only pay heed to section 9A(2)(b), which provides for the ascertainment function of extrinsic materials in the event of ambiguity or absurdity, but to completely disregard the confi rmatory aspect of section 9A(2)(a). Ironically, while the courts increased their focus on interpreting statutory provisions in their proper context, they had failed to appreciate that section 9A(2) did not require ambiguity or absurdity for extrinsic materials to be used. 56 In fact, in Re How William Glen , 57 the position curiously came to be resolved unequivocally in favour of the position that ambiguity and absurdity were essential prerequisites prior to the reference to extrinsic materials.
The position only came to be corrected in Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995 , in which the Tribunal repeated, but did not expressly adopt, the Attorney General's argument that section 9A enabled the Tribunal to ' look at all legislative materials to ascertain the meaning of any provision of a written law, whether or not that provision was ambiguous ' . 58 The fi rst case to unequivocally clarify the uncertainty in this regard appears to be the Singapore High Court decision of ACS Computer Pte Ltd v. Rubina Watch Co (Pte) Ltd , 59 in which Warren Khoo J referred to sections 9A(2)(a) and 9A(2)(b), 60 thereby taking into account the ascertainment function of section 9A(2). The ascertainment function of section 9A(2), of course, does not require there to be ambiguity or absurdity to operate. In Planmarine AG v. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore , the Singapore Court of Appeal fi nally referred to sections 9A(2)(a) and 9A(2)(b) separately and affi rmed the confi rmatory function of section 9A(2)(a). 61 The ambiguity in relation to the use of extrinsic materials appears to have been further cleared up in later cases, 62 although there remains the occasional statement from the courts which adds a degree of confusion to the entire issue. For instance, in Progress Software Corporation (S) Pte Ltd v. Central Provident Fund Board , 63 the Court of Appeal stated that section 9A(2) provides that extrinsic materials should be used only where the statutory provision is ambiguous, obscure, or leads to ambiguity.
54 [1993] 3 SLR 580. This decision was also noted by Beckman and Phang, above n 27. 55 Ibid. at 587 (emphasis added). 56 See also, for e.g. Public Prosecutor v. Keh See Hua [1994] 2 SLR 277 at 280 where mention was made to only the ascertainment function of section 9A(2), although the court did fi nd am ambiguity in the interpretation of section 5(8) of the Employment of Foreign Workers ' Act (Cap. 91A, 1991 rev. edn.), the statutory provision concerned. 57 [1994] at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
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Finally, the third issue concerns the types of extrinsic materials referable following the enactment of section 9A. In this regard, there generally appears to be no closed list as to the type of extrinsic materials referable. Indeed, it seems that the courts take the general view that section 9A(3), which provides some examples of the types of extrinsic materials referable, is not exhaustive and therefore a wide range of materials can be referred to. This approach was confi rmed by the Singapore High Court in ACS Computer Pte Ltd v. Rubina Watch Co (Pte) Ltd , in which Khoo J held that the list of materials set out in section 9A(3) ' is not exhaustive ' and that the ' general provision ' of the section ' allows reference to any material capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision in the circumstances stated in [section] 9A ' . 64 Thus, under section 9A(3)(b), the courts have made several references to explanatory statements relating to the Bill concerned. 65 As for section 9A(3)(c), which allows for reference to the Second Reading speech, the courts have made full use of this section. 66 For section 9A(3) (d), which allows for reference to ' any relevant material in any offi cial record of debates in Parliament ' , the courts have mainly referred to general comments of ministers prior to the introduction of the statute being interpreted 67 and simply extracts of debates. 68 Under section 9A(3)(f) read together section 9A(3), which does not limit the extrinsic materials referable, the courts have referred to previous manifestations of the Act concerned (whether local or foreign), 69 Select S tatute L aw R eview 208 Committee reports, 70 Law Revision Committees ' reports, 71 case law, 72 academic commentaries, 73 and even diplomatic notes exchanged in relation to international conventions. 74 Indeed, it has even been implied that there is nothing to differentiate between the types of extrinsic materials referable and that the court has to determine which material better assisted the court in construing the statutory provision concerned. 75 In many cases, references have been made to extrinsic materials without considering section 9A(3). 76 However, there appears to be a concurrent line of cases which seek to limit the type of extrinsic materials referable. In Lee Kwang Peng v. Public Prosecutor , 77 the Singapore High Court stated that section 9A(3) did not warrant the use of academic texts in construing the intention of Parliament as academic texts and the private works of draftsmen were ' conspicuously absent ' from the list of extrinsic materials provided in section 9A (3). 78 Yet another instance of a decision attempting to limit the extrinsic materials referable is Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor , 79 in which M. Karthigesu JA held that it was not correct to rely on earlier material to interpret subsequent legislation as if the subsequent legislation was tailored from a retrospective standpoint to fi t in seamlessly with the earlier Act. He referred to sections 9A(3)(b) and 9A (3) at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from question , and thereby found support for his proposition that when interpreting an amendment to an Act, the court must look not to the explanations to the Act itself, but the explanations to the amendment. 80 Although the learned judge stated that he was aware of the wide ambit of section 9A(3)(d), he did not think it wise to set a precedent for the unregulated use of original material in construing a subsequent amendment. 81 The above thereby sets out and explains the general statutory interpretation approach in Singapore. Generally speaking, the Singapore courts have adopted a fairly broad and expansive interpretation of section 9A. First, the purposive approach is regarded as being mandatory in all cases of statutory interpretation. The courts have been more active than ever to search for the ' legislative intent ' in most cases, although there appears to be some doubt as to whether the purposive approach applies fully in cases involving the interpretation of penal statutes. Secondly, there appears now to be no limit to the circumstances in which recourse to extrinsic materials is permitted. The courts no longer draw the distinction between sections 9A(2)(a) and 9A(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act which, strictly speaking, allow for different uses of the extrinsic materials depending on which subsection is invoked. Extrinsic materials are referred to and used expansively without a considered discussion of the actual ambit of section 9A(2). Thirdly, while there is a countervailing force seeking to restrict the type of extrinsic materials referable, the predominant view appears to be that there is no real limit and the courts have indeed referred to a whole list of materials, sometimes without expressly considering whether these are ' actually ' useful in interpreting the 80 [1998] ). Prima facie, Yong CJ's remarks would seem to contradict Rajah JA's remarks in Low Kok Heng that no ambiguity or absurdity be necessary for recourse to extrinsic materials, and the learned judge was alive to the problem as he sought to rationalize Yong CJ's remarks in Volkswagen Financial Services by saying that there was a ' relevancy ' test before extrinsic materials may be relied on. Rajah JA thought that extrinsic materials had to be ' relevant ' before they could be relied upon. It is respectfully submitted, based on the foregoing analysis relating to the prerequisite in section 9A(2) that such a requirement is not needed. Indeed, the key to understanding Yong CJ's statement is to appreciate that there were two separate issues at play: fi rst, the circumstances when a court could turn to (or ' consider ' ) extrinsic materials and second, under those circumstances, the weight which the court should accord to the extrinsic materials. Viewed holistically, perhaps what Rajah JA (and, to some extent, Yong CJ) had in mind when he spoke of ' relevancy ' was the subsequent weight the court could ascribe to the extrinsic materials after it had evaluated its relevancy by way of prior consideration . Viewed this way, the purported test of ' relevancy ' fi nds no place in the scheme of section 9A(2). Indeed, reading the Minister's Second Reading speech for the Interpretation ( Amendment) Bill 1993, it is not at all clear that the legislative intent was that a limit should be placed on the circumstances in which extrinsic materials are referable. The court can choose not to place any weight on the extrinsic materials placed before it, but this is not to say that there is a rule against reliance where such materials are ' irrelevant ' . On one reading, indeed, it could be said that Yong CJ's dicta in Volkswagen Financial Services is inconsistent with section 9A(2). Therefore, it is suggested that there be no relevancy criteria read into section 9A(2) when the section is quite clear that there is no conceivable circumstances in which extrinsic materials cannot be considered (as opposed to used ).
at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from statutory provision at hand. Most tellingly, section 9A(4), which places a limit on the use of extrinsic materials, has only been expressly referred to in two decisions, namely, Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995 and Planmarine AG v. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore . Yet, in neither of these decisions was section 9A(4) actually comprehensively explained nor expressly invoked. It would be fair to say that section 9A(4) has never been expressly used by a Singapore court before.
In the fi nal analysis, the Singapore approach is based on broad rules as opposed to a more sophisticated consideration of the nuances of section 9A. For now, these broad approaches will be compared with the approach in statutory interpretation in Australia. The comparison with the Australian approach is especially interesting since section 9A of the Interpretation Act was in fact based on the equivalent sections in Australian legislation.
Comparison with the Australian Statutory Interpretation Approach (A) Background to the Australian Statutory Interpretation Approach
In order to appreciate the possible differences in the treatment of certain issues in Australia, it is necessary to set out the legislative differences which exist between both jurisdictions. In both jurisdictions, there exists legislation providing for the adoption of certain principles of statutory interpretation. In Singapore, this, as discussed above, is section 9A of the Interpretation Act. In Australia, it is sections 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). 82 The Commonwealth Parliament introduced these sections in 1981 and 1984 following symposia which pushed for their adoption. The 1981 symposium led to the introduction of the new section 15AA in Parliament. In the second reading speech introducing the legislation, it was said that the purpose of section 15AA was to ' confi rm that in interpreting provisions regard is to be had to the object or purpose underlying the Act in question ' , as well as to prevent the overly legalistic approach taken by the courts of the time. 83 On the other hand, section 15AB was expressed to be Parliament's ' clear lead ' as to the way which extrinsic materials are to be used. 84 Following the enactment of sections 15AA and 15AB in the Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act 1901 -section 15AA Regard to be had to purpose or object of Act
(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object Acts Interpretation Act 1901 -section 15AB Use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of an Act
(1) Subject to subsection (3), in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, if any material not forming part of the Act is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material:
(a) to confi rm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; or (b) to determine the meaning of the provision when:
(i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or (ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable.
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the material that may be considered in accordance with that subsection in the interpretation of a provision of an Act includes: (3) In determining whether consideration should be given to any material in accordance with subsection (1), or in considering the weight to be given to any such material, regard shall be had, in addition to any other relevant matters, to:
(a) the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act; and (b) the need to avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating advantage.
While section 9A of the Interpretation Act and sections 15AA and 15AB of the (Australian) Acts Interpretation Act (Cth) are substantively similar, there are some subtle differences. On a ' general ' level, there are two differences. First, while the word ' interpretation ' is used in section 9A(1), ' construction ' is used in section 15AA. This is not a signifi cant difference but it should be noted that although the term construction is often used interchangeably with ' interpretation ' , at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
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A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 213 some commentators in the area of contractual interpretation regard these as qualitatively different processes. 86 Secondly, while the expression ' written law ' is used throughout section 9A, the word ' Act ' is used in its place in both sections 15AA and 15AB. It should also be noted that section 18 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) uses the word written law as well. 87 The practical effect of this is whether the expression written law covers the same ground as the word Act. Two commentators writing shortly after the 1993 legislative reform noted this difference, 88 but they made no defi nite conclusion on the issue. Ultimately, it is suggested that the difference in wording is not signifi cant. This is because while written law is defi ned in section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act to include all Acts, Ordinances and subsidiary legislation being in force in Singapore, section 46 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 or section 13 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 provides that the principles set out in the principal Act are also applicable to delegated legislation. Accordingly, there is no great disparity in either the ordinary meaning or the scope of section 9A and sections 15AA and 15AB as a result of this particular difference in the statutory language.
On a more ' specifi c ' level, there is one signifi cant difference between section 9A and sections 15AA and 15AB: this concerns the list of extrinsic materials referable under section 9A(3) as contrasted with section 15AB(2). In part, this is due to the structural differences in the legislative processes of Singapore and Australia. Thus, while section 15AB(2)(b) provides that any relevant report of a Royal Commission, Law Reform Commission, and so on, may be referable, there is no such equivalent body formally established in Singapore. As such, the omission of section 15AB(2)(b) is perfectly understandable, although, it must be said, the ' catch all ' provision under section 9A(3) (viz., that the list of materials is not exhaustive) ought to negate any real differences between the list of materials in sections 9A(3) and 15AB(2). This is because, theoretically, given the non-exhaustive nature of both provisions, any extrinsic material may be referred to by the court.
On the whole, it can be seen that both section 9A and sections 15AA and 15AB are more similar than different. Any linguistic difference is not radically significant. The next section then deals with how the Australian approach to statutory interpretation has been in the light of sections 15AA and 15AB.
(B) Differences in Treatment of Certain Issues (i) Issues relating to the purposive approach
With regard to the broad issues relating to the purposive approach, similar with the initial Singapore reaction to the enactment of section 9A(1), the initial S tatute L aw R eview 214 Australian reaction to section 15AA was guarded. The initial reluctance of the Australian courts to fully embrace the new purposive approach as legislated can be found in the case law. In one of the fi rst, if not the fi rst, cases to make express reference to section 15AA, the Federal Court of Australia in Re Heath 89 had to interpret section 39 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth). Franki J, in the majority, decided that it was not appropriate to depart from the literal meaning of the provision since this had a ' powerful advantage in ordinary meaning and grammatical sense ' . 90 Although Franki J did consider that the interpretation could not have been ' unintended ' by the legislature, 91 it is clear that his conclusion rested on the presumption laid down in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 92 that if an interpretation has a ' powerful advantage in ordinary and grammatical sense ' , it would be representative of the legislative intent unless otherwise disproved. Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation was decided before the enactment of section 15AA, but it seems to have been cited by Franki J without an overt consideration of its interaction with section 15AA. It is at least arguable that the effect of section 15AA would be to displace the judicially pronounced presumption, since section 15AA mandated the courts to interpret statutes purposively, and not seek recourse to the literal rule in the fi rst instance. Similarly, in the later case of Re Meredyth Town v. Australian Telecommunications Commission and Alfred Alexander Eves , 93 Franki J in interpreting section 5(a) of the Commonwealth Employees (Employment Provisions) Act 1977 held that the words ' by reason of the existence of any industrial action ' were ' too plain ' to have recourse to section 15AA. Once again, this suggested that the purposive approach operated secondarily to other common law principles of interpretation. 94 Indeed, in the fi rst High Court of Australia decision to cite section 15AA, the Court at least implied that some degree of ambiguity was needed before section 15AA could be turned to. 95 at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
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A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 215 decisions applying section 15AA as a matter of course, 96 the general judicial attitude in the few years after section 15AA was enacted could perhaps be best summed up by Bryson J's extrajudicial comment, 97 in which he said that section 15AA has not signalled any large new turn in the construction of statutes and that the appropriate response to that provision ought to be to treat it as declaratory. 98 In the end, it took the High Court of Australia a little less than 10 years after the enactment of section 15AA to lay down authoritatively its proper interpretation in Mills v. Meeking , 99 albeit through an interpretation of state legislation substantively similar with the Commonwealth legislation. In that case, Dawson J examined section 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), which was substantively similar with section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. 100 As such, his comments have been taken to be just as applicable to the Commonwealth statute as well. 101 He said: 102
[T]he literal rule of construction, whatever the qualifi cations with which it is expressed, must give way to a statutory injunction to prefer a construction which would promote the purpose of an Act to one which would not, especially where that purpose is set out in the Act. Section 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act must, I think, mean that the purposes stated in Pt 5 of the Road Safety Act are to be taken into account in construing the provisions of that Part, not only where those provisions on their face offer more than one construction, but also in determining whether more than one construction is open. The requirement that a court look to the purpose or object of the Act is thus more than an instruction to adopt the traditional S tatute L aw R eview 216 mischief or purpose rule in preference to the literal rule of construction. The mischief or purpose rule required an ambiguity or inconsistency before a court could have regard to purpose: Miller v . The Commonwealth [1904] HCA 34; (1904) 1 CLR 668 at p 674; Wacal Developments Pty. Ltd. v . Realty Developments Pty. Ltd. [1978] HCA 30; (1978) 140 CLR 503 at p 513. The approach required by s 35 needs no ambiguity or inconsistency; it allows a court to consider the purposes of an Act in determining whether there is more than one possible construction. Reference to the purposes may reveal that the draftsman has inadvertently overlooked something which he would have dealt with had his attention been drawn to it and if it is possible as a matter of construction to repair the defect, then this must be done. However, if the literal meaning of a provision is to be modifi ed by reference to the purposes of the Act, the modifi cation must be precisely identifi able as that which is necessary to effectuate those purposes and it must be consistent with the wording otherwise adopted by the draftsman. Section 35 requires a court to construe an Act, not to rewrite it, in the light of its purposes.
It is clear after this decision that the purposive approach as embodied in section 15AA applied mandatorily even where there was no ambiguity or absurdity. 103 This is similar with the approach in Singapore. Interestingly, across both jurisdictions, there was a period of initial reluctance to follow the statutory enactment. One reason in Australia could be that the High Court decided Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation just shortly before section 15AA was enacted. While that case was generally in line with the principles behind section 15AA, the presence of such an authoritative decision just prior to section 15AA's enactment meant that the latter was always going to be interpreted in the former case's shadow. In Singapore, a similar shadow existed, although the fl avour was distinctly English rather than local. The strong persuasive strength of English authorities in 1993, when section 9A was enacted, meant that the courts had to grapple with what would be regarded as a ' radical ' departure, or to follow the status quo. In the end, the courts struck a balanced approach, and, similar with the Australian approach, took some time to interpret section 9A in its correct spirit.
However, unlike Singapore, in some Australian cases the proposition that the purposive approach applies mandatorily is expressed slightly differently, and this creates problems of its own. Rather than begin with the position that the purposive approach applies at the start, some cases state that the court must follow the ordinary meaning of the statutory text unless to do so would not give effect to the legislative intent (or ' object or purpose underlying the Act ' , pursuant to the words of section 15AA). This, as would be appreciated, puts the analysis the other way round. Saraswati v. The Queen , 106 thought that if the literal or grammatical meaning of a provision does not give effect to the purpose of the Act it was in, that meaning cannot be regarded as the ' ordinary meaning ' and must give way to a meaning which will promote the underlying purpose or object. 107 However, where the text is grammatically capable of only one meaning and neither the context nor any purpose of the Act throws any real doubt on that meaning, the grammatical meaning is to be adopted as the ordinary meaning. This ordinary meaning can be departed from only if it leads to a result that is ' manifestly absurd ' or ' unreasonable ' taking into account the purpose of the Act. 108 With respect, this is a curiously circular way of stating the proposition. If in the fi rst place, ordinary meaning embodies the concept of the words giving effect to the ' purpose ' of the Act, then it would be superfl uous to regard it as being possible to depart from this ordinary meaning where they produce an ambiguity or absurdity taking into account the purposes of the Act. 109 But quite apart from this rather problematic way of stating the effect of section 15AA, most cases have taken the simpler (but no less correct) view that the purposive approach simply requires the court to give effect to the legislative intent which, as discussed earlier, is similar with the Singapore approach. However, apart from the broad question of when section 15AA may be applied, there are several more specifi c issues relating to the purposive approach as used in both Singapore and Australia, which this article now discusses.
First, what is the Australian position as regards the true meaning of the purposive approach? The confl ation between the purposive approach and the use of extrinsic materials does not appear to be as pronounced in Australia as in Singapore. In fact, there appears only very few cases in which the confl ation is seen. One of these cases is Irish Country Bacon (Cooked Meats) Limited v.
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Comptroller-General of Customs and Castle Bacon Pty Limited , 110 in which the Federal Court of Australia held that it could arrive at a clear interpretation of section 42 of the Customs Act 1901 and thereby did not require the assistance of sections 15AA and 15AB. While this might at fi rst indicate an unwarranted requirement of ambiguity or absurdity before the application of the purposive approach, the Court makes clear in its judgment that it only had in mind the recourse to extrinsic materials. 111 If so, by expressly including section 15AA, the Court clearly treated section 15AA as so related with section 15AB that it arguably confl ated the two issues. However, in the vast majority of cases, the courts show a very clear awareness of the difference between sections 15AA and 15AB, as distinguished from Singapore. It may be that this is due to a very practical reason, whereas the twin issues of purposive approach and the use of extrinsic materials are in a ' single ' statutory provision in Singapore, namely section 9A, the two issues are separately addressed in ' two ' statutory provisions in Australia, namely sections 15AA and 15AB. The confl ation of the two issues in Singapore may in fact stem from the statutory confl ation of the two issues in Singapore in a single provision, thereby leading the Singapore courts to wrongly believe that the two are closely linked.
The second issue for comparison is the line both jurisdictions draw between ' interpreting ' a statutory provision and ' rewriting ' the provision. It is clear that the Australian courts take the broad view that section 15AA does not permit the courts to ignore the actual words of a statute. But while the Singapore approach imposes this condition because of the fear of judicial legislation, the Australian reasoning is much more sophisticated. One reason concerns the ' two meaning ' requirement. This is said to arise from the use of the word ' prefer ' in section 15AA: that is taken to imply that there must be two possible meanings for the court to prefer one over the other. This requirement in fact fl ows from the fi ne distinctions that the Australian cases draw in relation to the circumstances in which the purposive approach may be applied. 113 to the effect that section 15AA requires a court to prefer one construction to another. Such a requirement can only have meaning where two constructions are otherwise open. However, even if the words can bear the meaning advanced, the question section 15AA requires a court to address is whether one construction promotes the purpose of the Act and another does not. It is not which would best achieve the objects of the Act; that would be to stray into the prohibited realm of legislating. 114 Indeed, in Romano Trevisan v. Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia itself, the Court emphasized that it was A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 219 not for the courts to legislate; a meaning, though illuminated by the statutory injunction to promote the purpose or object underlying the Act, must be found in the words of Parliament. 115 To similar effect, Fitzgerald J said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Trustees of the Lisa Marie Walsh Trust : ' [E]ven if the extrinsic material does reveal the legislative purpose, there will continue to be boundaries beyond which the words used will not stretch even where it is known that they were intended to do so ' . 116 In the very recent case of White v. Designated Manager of IP Australia (No. 2) , 117 the Federal Court refused to depart from the unambiguous clear meaning of the statutory provision because the applicant failed to advance any plausible construction by demonstrating any patent or even latent ambiguity in the text as a matter of ordinary syntax and grammar. 118 In essence, it could be said that the Australian approach is fairly cautious against the danger of judicial legislation. 119 Thus, while the Singapore courts undoubtedly require a possible meaning to fi t within the words of the statute, the requirement is not as strict. In the fi rst place, there is no requirement for a second possible meaning for the court to prefer over another. It is not treated as judicial legislating if the court were simply to ' impose ' a given meaning to the statutory provision; in this context, the word prefer in section 9A (1) Taxation v. John Langford Knight (1983) (1) is not a warrant for redrafting legislation nearer to an assumed desire of the legislature ' : at [19]); Newcastle City Council v. GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 (When the express words of a legislative provision are reasonably capable of only one construction and neither the purpose of the provision nor any other provision in the legislation throws doubt on that construction, a court cannot ignore it and substitute a different construction because it furthers the objects of the legislation); Dennis John Whitaker v. Comcare [1998] FCA 1099 (it is an intent to be gathered from the language used, in its context and with the aid of those materials to which the court can properly have recourse in seeking that intent. However, if it is not possible for the Court to be confi dent of the intent of the author, it is not, we think, open to the Court to invent, under the guise of interpretation, its own version of how it thinks the text might read) at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
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S tatute L aw R eview 220 section a very expansive reach. Moreover, the Singapore approach does not deem it improper to depart from a perfectly possible meaning if to do so would be to give effect to the legislative intent; it is fairly easy to rebut the presumption that Parliament always expresses itself in clear language. Indeed, this is not an indefensible position to take: surely the enactment of section 9A would show that Parliament itself believes that it may not be clear on its use of language, hence the need for, inter alia, recourse to extrinsic materials. However, there is something to be said of the extent of the Australian caution against judicial legislating; indeed, in Singapore, as discussed earlier, the courts have sometimes written into statutes concepts completely alien at the time of enactment. The best approach, perhaps, is a balance between the two approaches.
Moving forward to the third issue for consideration, it is whether the purposive approach gives way to other common law principles of statutory interpretation in cases concerning penal statutes. As seen above, the Singapore position with regards to penal statutes is unclear in view of the contradictory dicta in Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng . Fortunately, this issue has been dealt with by the Australian courts in consideration of section 15AA so as to provide a point of consideration. In some cases, the Australian approach is identical with that adopted in Singapore, that is the strict construction rule applies if the purposive approach fails. 120 Thus, in Trade Practices Commission v. TNT Management Pty Limited , 121 after considering the effects of sections 15AA and 15AB, Franki J followed the holding of Gibbs J in Beckwith v. The Queen 122 and said that if the language of the Act after the ordinary rules of construction have been applied remains ambiguous or doubtful, it is appropriate to remove or resolve that ambiguity or doubt in favour of a defendant, at least, where the proceedings are for a penalty. 123 In contrast to that approach, in Re A Reference To the Federal Court of Australia By the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal , 124 the Federal Court of Australia arguably took the view that the purposive approach overruled the strict construction rule concerning penal statutes. In stating that section 15AA embodied ' a more important rule ' , 125 the Court had earlier in the judgment rejected the application of the strict construction rule, albeit on the ground that the question of penal sanction was not actually affected by the statute concerned. 126 Hence, it could be argued that this is at least some authority that the purposive approach applied to the exclusion of the strict construction rule. In Newcastle City Council v. GIO General Ltd , 127 it was held by the High Court of provision. It was fi rst said that the general object casts little, if any, light on the meaning of the specifi c provisions under the Act concerned. Indeed, even under the umbrella of the general object is a multitude of objects of specifi c provisions. 137 Similarly, in Carr v. The State of Western Australia , 138 the High Court of Australia held that the purposive approach may be of little assistance where a statutory provision strikes a balance between competing interests, and the problem of interpretation is that there is uncertainty as to how far the provision goes in seeking to achieve the underlying purpose or object of the Act. Glesson CJ pointed out that legislation rarely pursues a single purpose at all costs, where the problem is one of doubt about the extent to which the legislation pursues a purpose, stating the purpose is unlikely to solve the problem. In a practical evaluation of the problem, he said that for a court to construe the legislation as though it pursued the purpose to the fullest possible extent might be contrary to the manifest intention of the legislation and a purported exercise of judicial power for a legislative purpose. 139 The distinction is undoubtedly a very fi ne and sophisticated one; on a very practical level, one may wonder how useful the questions put forward by the learned Chief Justice really are in view of the express wording of section 15AA (and section 9A (1)). It would be diffi cult to attach a caveat to the proposition that courts are to give effect to the legislative intent such that in some cases, it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend to further that intention beyond what is commonly intended. It is an intention upon an intention and may be diffi cult to resolve on a practical level. It may be better, in the interests of convenience, to fi rst have a broad proposition that general and specifi c purposes are usually the same or complementary or at least related and second, to presume that in the normal course of events, Parliament intended for its stated purpose to be pursued to the fullest extent. To think otherwise may, in some cases, amount likewise to judicial legislating and frustrate the legislative intent. Rather than lay down a complicated set of rules which, although more refl ective of the true state of legislating, it is suggested that the simplicity of the Singapore approach preserves the true essence of section 9A(1) (and section 15AA) while reserving to a province of pragmatism certain justifi able departures which, it is envisaged, will not be many. To think otherwise may add confusion rather than clarity.
(ii) Clarifying circumstances in which reference to extrinsic materials permitted
Moving away from the issues surrounding the purposive approach to the circumstances in which reference to extrinsic materials may be taken, the broad 137 [2003] at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org
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S tatute L aw R eview 224 the Act concerned may be used to discover the underlying purpose or object and then to confi rm that the ordinary meaning was intended. 144 In other words, if the provision concerned is clear on its face, extrinsic materials may only be used to ' confi rm ' the ordinary meaning. Extrinsic materials may be referred to, but they cannot ' alter ' the interpretation that the court, without reference to those materials, would place upon the provision. Reliance is also placed on a sentence in the second-reading speech of the Minister when introducing the Consequential Provisions Act, but that reliance is misplaced. Section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), as amended, does not permit recourse to that speech for the purpose of departing from the ordinary meaning of the text unless either the meaning of the provision to be construed is ambiguous or obscure or in its ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. In our view neither of those conditions is satisfi ed in the present case.
While extrinsic materials may be taken in place even when the provision is clear in its face, the ' effect ' of these extrinsic materials will differ according to whether it is the confi rmatory or ascertainment function of section 15AB(1) that is being invoked. As Pearce and Geddes have written, in order that a reference to extrinsic materials may have the potential to change an interpretation of legislation which would otherwise have been arrived at, it is necessary for a court to conclude that one of the conditions in section 15AB(1)(b)(i) or (ii) has been met. That means that the court must conclude, without taking account of any materials not forming part of the Act, that the provision in question is ' ambiguous ' or ' obscure ' or that, taking account of its context and underlying purpose or object, the ordinary meaning leads to a result that is ' manifestly absurd ' or ' unreasonable ' . This is a limitation on the operation of section 15AB compared with section 15AA. There are examples of cases whereby the court considers the extrinsic materials and then concludes that they cannot assist because the words are not ambiguous or obscure and that giving the words their ordinary meaning does not lead to a ' manifestly absurd ' or unreasonable result. 147 However, a contrary view was taken in Parrett v. Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services . 148 In that case, the Federal Court of Australia held that: 149 Section 15AB(1)(a) has sometimes been considered as being of limited utility -see Pearce and op cit pp 60 -62. The view seems to have been 144 Pearce and Geddes, above n 2, 80. 145 (1986) 68 ALR 416. 146 (1986) taken that one cannot look to extrinsic material under para (1)(a) of s 15AB if the effect of such resort would be to depart from the ordinary meaning of the statutory text. However, with respect, para (1)(a) permits resort to extraneous material for the purpose of confi rming (to confi rm) that the real meaning of the text is its ordinary meaning. Para (1)(a) does not prohibit sensible use of a contrary indication resulting from a lack of such confi rmation after looking at the non-statutory material, nor would it seem logical or profi table that such a prohibition should be implied, having regard to the far-reaching effect, which I take now to be settled, of s 15AA.
This contrary view would seem to have taken root in Singapore; it might be more plausible to say that the Singapore courts have yet to apply their minds to this specifi c issue. Indeed, the Singapore courts have merely used section 9A(2) generally and wholly, without distinguishing as to the effect of the provision bearing in mind whether there was ambiguity or absurdity to begin with. This may not be an incorrect approach. This approach could be justifi ed on the basis that if, say, the purposively reached meaning was not ambiguous or absurd, and the court seeks extrinsic materials to confi rm this meaning but, upon doing so, realizes that there is now a better meaning to promote the purpose and object of the Act. If so, there is, by defi nition, an ambiguity or absurdity such that section 9A(2)(b) operates seamlessly to permit the court to adopt a different meaning. It might be better to treat sections 9A(2)(a) and 9A(2)(b) as operating seamlessly with one another, with one ready to take over the other should the circumstances permit upon the consideration of the extrinsic materials. This is, arguably, though maybe unintentionally, the approach adopted by the Singapore courts.
On a related note, and even more interestingly, the High Court of Australia in Newcastle City Council v. GIO General Ltd seemed to suggest that notwithstanding section 15AB, the court could still refer to extrinsic materials when it said that independently of section 15AB, the modern approach to statutory interpretation permits recourse to the extrinsic material. This seems to suggest that section 15AB is merely declaratory rather than permissive. The application of a common law authority has not been considered in Singapore, although it is arguable that such an authority exists since the Singapore courts have not usually cited section 9A(2) in referring to extrinsic materials in aid of statutory interpretation.
(iii) Limiting the type extrinsic materials permitted?
Finally, while there has been much use of section 15AB to admit and take account of extrinsic materials in Australia, is there a limit on the type of extrinsic materials permitted? The High Court of Australia, for example, has relied on the provision to take account of parliamentary debates, particularly the reports of the Second Reading speech by the minister concerned as well as explanatory memoranda. 150 We were pressed with the Treasurer's Explanatory Memorandum to Parliament, which accompanied the Bill by which s.94 was introduced into the Act, as an aid to construction. It may be that such material is admissible for the purpose of disclosing the object of the section, thus providing a basis in appropriate cases for the implementation of s.15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act in addition, of course, to the rules of the common law which permit and require due regard to legislative intention which is manifest despite inappropriate phraseology: see, e.g. Tickle Industries Pty Ltd v. Hann [1974] Franki J found section 15AB ' diffi cult to apply ' , especially cases where at least some counsel are not easily deterred by the time required to argue a point fully. 153 It would seem that there exists in both Singapore and Australia a certain desire on the part of the courts to restrict recourse to extrinsic materials. However, the manners in which both jurisdictions have gone about doing so are rather different. In Singapore, as seen, the approach is to expressly ' ban ' certain types of materials even though nowhere is this allowed for on the face of an expansive section 9A(2) read with section 9A(3). In Australia, this reluctance is expressed as not giving any weight to the extrinsic material which is deemed to be useless by the court; the difference between reference and weight is well understood by the Australian courts in this regard. Interestingly, while section 15AB(3) has been cited in many Australian decisions, that provision, like in Singapore, has not really been expressly applied. It may be that section 15AB(3) (and section 9A(4)) is diffi cult to apply in practice because it would be hard to identify situations in which it applies.
Analyzing the Differences in the Singapore and Australian Approaches
As has been seen, it would be justifi ed to say that the Singapore courts have, from an initially cautious approach, now adopted an expansive interpretation of the 150 Pearce and Geddes, above n 2, 83. 151 (1983) 69 FLR 240. 152 (1985 ) 58 ALR 423. 153 (1985 58 ALR 423 at [265] .
at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from tory interpretation. The approach in Australia, while equally expansive now, took perhaps a bit longer to effect, and there are signs that the approach is not yet as expansive as in Singapore. However, while the Australian approach is stated in a series of sophisticated rules taking into account the exact words of sections 15AA and 15AB, the Singapore approach is stated more broadly and sometimes carried out without very detailed consideration of the law. It will now be suggested that the approach in statutory interpretation in Singapore, as well as the difference between that approach and the Australian approach, may be attributable to unique factors not found elsewhere.
(A) Ease of Reference to Applicable Materials
The rapid development of statutory interpretation in Singapore following the enactment of section 9A may be attributable to the ease of reference to applicable materials. The rule as stated is an easy one: give effect to the legislative intent of Parliament. To give effect to that rule might be diffi cult if the reference to applicable materials is not forthcoming enough. It is suggested that the ease of such reference in fact encouraged the courts to give effect to section 9A to its fullest possible effect, to the extent of even glossing over the statutory language to accord it a more expansive interpretation than is the case in Australia. First, parliamentary debates and select committee reports in Singapore are readily available to practising lawyers by way of the local Lawnet 2 database at an affordable cost. 154 While old legislative materials may not be as easily available, the situation is improving with the increased digitization of books online. The relatively small size of the Singapore jurisdiction also means that legislative amendments are more easily tracked and researched. In fact, there has recently been websites 155 launched consolidating recent developments in Singapore law, increasing further the ease of research. Secondly, the Attorney General Chambers now provides a free electronic database of all Singapore statutes, including a brief citation of the history of the statute concerned. This makes it easier for lawyers to do preliminary research before going into the databases. 156 But more important is the actual ' effectiveness ' of these materials. Parliamentary materials are actually easy to read and straight to the point. This is partly due to the nature of Singapore politics, whereby a single political party dominates the Parliament. As such, Bills are passed without excessive debates which usually carry with them superfl uous language which makes for diffi cult reading and (more importantly) deciphering. 157 As contrasted with Australia as well, the relatively fewer number of Bills passed per year and the lack of state legislation 154 Accessible at http://www.lawnet.com.sg . 155 See, for e.g. Singapore Law Watch, accessible at http://www.singaporelawwatch.com . 156 Accessible at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg . 157 The situation has not changed much from 15 years ago: see Beckman and Phang, above n 27, 90.
at National University of Singapore on January 10, 2011 slr.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from S tatute L aw R eview 228 makes for easier reference as well. All these factors make for the implementation of section 9A easy and quick. Rather than be hampered by excessive submissions, it is submitted that the courts, in construing problematic statutes, are actually aided by the availability of materials. This may well explain why, notwithstanding the few cases which seem to show a resistance to extrinsic materials, accept these materials rather receptively. Altogether, this may well explain the rapid development of statutory interpretation in Singapore in the fi rst instance.
(B) Smaller Numbers and Interaction Between Singapore and Australian Cases
Next, as to the broad propositions of law coming from the Singapore courts, this may be attributable to two reasons. First, whereas there are state and federal courts in Australia, the court system in Singapore is a single vertical system. There are thereby fewer courts and fewer cases reaching them in relation to statutory interpretation. Fewer cases may mean that less chances for the courts to develop anything more than broad principles. In the fullness of time, the Singapore courts may well develop similarly complicated rules as the Australian authorities. The more uniform nature of the Singapore approach may likewise be attributable to the smaller number of Singapore cases; fewer cases mean lesser opportunities for confusion. Secondly, the lack of interaction between the Singapore and Australian cases may likewise explain the different approach taken in Singapore. As to the lack of reference to Australian cases, it may be thought that there are two reasons for this. First, as canvassed earlier, the Singapore Parliament did not make it clear that section 9A was based on sections 15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act. While lawyers would of course be able to fi gure this out, the lack of an express linkage may mean that the Singapore courts are far less willing to consider Australian decisions than if such express linkage had been made. Thus, apart from Public Prosecutor v. Low Kok Heng , which made rather extensive reference to Australian decisions, the citation of Australian decisions pertaining to sections 15AA and 15AB was few. Indeed, the only widely cited case appears to be Mills v. Meeking , 158 and this only for very broad propositions such as that the purposive approach may be resorted to even if there is no ambiguity or absurdity. There had simply been no conscious effort by the Singapore courts to consider the more sophisticated points of law emerging from the broad body of Australian decisions touching on provisions which were substantively similar with section 9A. On a broader level, this state of affairs is refl ective of the long dependence that Singapore courts have had on English authorities to the exclusion of other 158 In, for e.g. Constitutional Reference No. 1 of 1995 No. 1 of [1995 2 SLR 201 and Planmarine AG v. Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 2 SLR 1.
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A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in Singapore 229 jurisdictions. Given Singapore's legal heritage, it had until recently given little consideration to non-English authorities, although the situation has since changed dramatically. Coupled with the ease of the use of extrinsic materials, the Singapore courts may have found it unnecessary (and indeed, did not have the necessary reference to Australian authorities) to develop rules refl ective of a more sophisticated analysis.
In the fi nal analysis, if there is one thing that unites both the Singapore and Australian approaches, it is the overhanging shadow of English law. With Singapore courts increasingly willing to consider other jurisdictions other than the English one, its approach to statutory interpretation may now take into account the Australian approach. Indeed, as discussed at the outset of the present article, provisions providing for principles of statutory interpretation are not at all uncommon, and the Singapore courts may one day have recourse to these other jurisdictions as well. However, for now, the Singapore approach is, it could be fairly said, a body of discernible and unique case law culminating in a broad and pragmatic reading of section 9A. For its benefi ts and problems, it is an approach which lends itself to reference from other jurisdictions as well.
Conclusion
To conclude, this article has provided a brief overview of the evolution of the Singapore position to its present form, and made a brief comparison with parallel developments in Australia, from which Singapore's provisions originated. The Singapore approach is interesting in that it developed quite independently from the Australian approach. It is a broad approach, with few specifi c rules. This makes it of easy application, no doubt aided by the easy (and direct) access to extrinsic materials, especially parliamentary materials. The ease of application, along with the implicit licence to develop on its own, has turned the Singapore approach into what it is today. In contrast, the Australian approach, which has had slightly more than a decade to develop than Singapore, is a series of sophisticated rules which broadly resemble the Singapore approach. It has most evidently given thought to problems which may have arisen due to the sheer large number of cases reaching the Australian courts. In the end, the Singapore courts will have to consider the Australian approach in greater detail, given the undoubted historical linkage between the two approaches. In the fullness of time, the Australian approach may well be more refl ective of the Singapore approach. However, for now, the Singapore approach, as unique as it is, is surely also a model of comparison for other jurisdictions in its own right.
